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   The advent of autonomous vessel technology heralds a new future for ac-
tivities on the world’s oceans. In the brightest vision of this future, global 
maritime shipping will be more efficient and ecologically sound, rescuers will 
have unprecedented ability to locate and assist those in peril at sea, and mar-
itime law enforcement officers will wield heretofore unknown tools to inter-
dict illicit maritime trafficking. In contrast to the promise of this vision lies 
the sobering reality that autonomous vessels challenge the existing interna-
tional order of the seas, from collision avoidance to safe manning and be-
yond. This article examines the extent to which the existing international 
order can address the challenges posed by autonomous vessel operations. It 
does so through the lens of the U.S. Coast Guard, whose legal authorities 
and operational capabilities as an armed force, law enforcement agency, and 
industry regulator provide a unique vantage for understanding the promise 
and perils of autonomous vessel technology. Specifically, this article will an-
alyze autonomous vessel technology in the context of three core Coast 
Guard mission areas: (1) search and rescue, (2) maritime counterdrug oper-
ations, and (3) navigational safety. It will argue that the dawn of autonomous 
vessels—a watershed moment in personal and digital maritime mobility with 
great potential for aiding humanity—is not an unmitigated good. Indeed, 
autonomous vessels are of singular importance precisely because of their ca-
pacity for misuse and even disaster. 
 
A.  The Era of Autonomy 
 
The era of autonomous vehicles is upon us. The ride-hailing company Uber 
is actively testing self-driving cars.1 Blue Origin and SpaceX, prominent com-
mercial space companies, have successfully conducted “autonomous preci-
sion landings” of their rockets.2 Semi-autonomous trucking is already under-
way, disrupting an industry that moves over half of the goods shipped in the 
                                                                                                                      
1. See Autonomous Vehicles are Just Around the Corner, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/01/autonomous-vehicles-are-just-
around-the-corner. 
2. Lars Blackmore, Autonomous Precision Landing of Space Rockets, in FRONTIERS OF EN-














United States.3 These rapid advances suggest that autonomous vessel tech-
nology may well “revolutionize personal and commercial transportation” as 
we know it.4  
A key component of this nascent era of autonomy is taking place on the 
world’s oceans.5 In the commercial context, international shipping is “on the 
verge of a technological revolution”—the rise of maritime autonomous sur-
face ships (MASS).6 For example, in 2018, Rolls-Royce and Finnish state-
owned ferry operator Finferries successfully navigated the ferry Falco under 
fully autonomous control.7 According to Mikael Makinen, president of 
Rolls-Royce Marine, “[a]utonomous shipping is the future of the maritime 
industry,” where it will be “as disruptive as the smartphone.”8 
But autonomous vessel developments have not been limited to commer-
cial applications. Indeed, enterprising naval forces have been the prime 
mover of autonomous vessel technology, with a profound catalyzing effect 
on the design and implementation of unmanned vehicles.9 The U.S. Navy 
                                                                                                                      
3. Aisha Chottangi, Greg Hastings, John Murnane & Florian Neuhaus, Distraction or 
Disruption? Autonomous Trucks Gain Ground in US Logistics, MCKINSEY (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/our-insights/dis-
traction-or-disruption-autonomous-trucks-gain-ground-in-us-logistics. 
4. See Jeremy A. Carp, Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation, 4 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 82, 84 (2018).  
5. See Paul Dean & Henry Clack, Autonomous Shipping and Maritime Law, in NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SHIPPING LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67, 67 
(Baris Soyer & Andrew Tettenborn eds., 2020) (“Once mere science fiction, autonomous 
ships . . . will soon become part of commercial reality.”). 
6. Aldo Chircop, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships in International Law: New Challenges for 
the Regulation of International Navigation and Shipping, in COOPERATION AND ENGAGEMENT IN 
THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 18, 18–19 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore & Ronan 
Long eds., 2020). 
7. Rolls-Royce and Finferries Demonstrate World’s First Fully Autonomous Ferry, ROLLS-ROYCE 
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.rolls-royce.com/media/press-releases/2018/03-12-2018-rr-
and-finferries-demonstrate-worlds-first-fully-autonomous-ferry.aspx. 
8. See Danielle Sullivan Kaminski, Who’s to Blame When no one is Manning the Ship?, 
LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/847478. 
9. See James Kraska, The Law of Unmanned Naval Systems in War and Peace, 5 THE JOURNAL 
OF OCEAN TECHNOLOGY 44, 44 (2010) (“Unmanned systems are becoming ubiquitous in 
the oceans, and naval forces throughout the world are primary operators of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs).”); see also CRAIG ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 278 (6th 
ed. 2014) (“[U]nmanned vehicle technology and automated networks will be an important 
basis of the future Navy. The littoral combat ship was, in fact, designed to carry and work 












has spearheaded this effort, issuing Master Plans for Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) in 2004 and 2007, 
respectively.10 In just over a decade, these plans have been implemented to 
a remarkable degree. For example, the U.S. Navy’s first operational UUV, 
the “Remote Mine-hunting System,” was deployed during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom for minesweeping of the Khwar Abd Allah River and the Iraqi port 
of Umm Qasr.11 In 2018, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) completed the Sea Hunter USV, a 130-foot vessel “capable of op-
erating autonomously or semi-autonomously for up to seventy days without 
resupply.”12  
Similarly, the Coast Guard has integrated unmanned and autonomous 
technology at sea. Its 418-foot national security cutter is now equipped with 
a ScanEagle aerial drone,13 and in February 2020, a contract was awarded to 
Spatial Integrated Systems Inc. to develop a USV system to increase mari-
time domain awareness in the remote Pacific Ocean.14 In addition to these 
naval applications, unmanned and autonomous vehicles are also used for a 
host of mixed naval, scientific, and commercial purposes, including seafloor 




                                                                                                                      
operate with unmanned aerial and marine systems and must be alert to the potential legal 
issues posed by their use.”). 
10. Craig Allen, Determining the Legal Status of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles: Formalism v. 
Functionalism, 49 JOURNAL OF MARITIME LAW AND COMMERCE 477, 478 (2018). 
11. Kraska, supra note 9, at 46. 
12. Christopher C. Swain, Towards Greater Certainty for Unmanned Navigation: A Recom-
mended United States Military Perspective on Application of the “Rules of the Road” to Unmanned Mar-
itime Systems, 3 GEORGETOWN LAW AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 119, 129 (2018); see also 
Allen, supra note 10, at 478. 
13. See Michael R. Sinclair, “A Few Armed [Drones], Judiciously Stationed, Might at a Small 
Expense be Made Useful Sentinels of the Law”: The Sufficiency of Existing Law as Applied to the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s Inevitable Use of Unmanned Aircraft Capable of Employing Use of Force in the Maritime 
Counter-Drug Mission, 18 LOYOLA MARITIME LAW JOURNAL 1, 23 (2019). 
14. Spatial Integrated Systems (SIS) Wins US Coast Guard Maritime Domain Awareness Pilot 
Study Contract, YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 25, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/spatial-
integrated-systems-sis-wins-130000100.html. 
15. Eric Van Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – an Exploration, 20 












B. Opportunities and Challenges 
 
Autonomous vessel technology opens up new possibilities in personal and 
digital maritime mobility and has the potential to deliver a host of economic, 
environmental, and public benefits.16 But it also presents exceptionally diffi-
cult questions: Is the existing international order of the seas equipped to deal 
with autonomous vessel operations?17 Can autonomous vessel technology 
fully discharge the duties of an experienced watch-stander at sea?18 Do the 
potentially devastating implications of an autonomous vessel cyberattack 
outweigh the anticipated benefits of autonomous operations?19 While these 
questions remain largely unanswered, the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) has recently undertaken a “regulatory scoping exercise” for the 
use of MASS to tackle these and other issues related to unmanned and au-
tonomous ships.20 Among other tasks, the IMO will determine which exist-
ing IMO instruments might preclude MASS operations, which instruments 
do not preclude MASS operations but may need to be amended or clarified, 
and which instruments are inapplicable to MASS operations.21 
                                                                                                                      
16. Carp, supra note 4, at 85. (“[A]utonomous vehicles promise to deliver significant 
social, economic, and environmental benefits to both consumers and businesses.”). 
17. See Natalie Klein, Maritime Autonomous Surface Vehicles within the International Law 
Framework to Enhance Maritime Security, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 244, 244 (2019) 
(“The use of maritime autonomous vehicles (MAVs) . . . raises challenging questions about 
how these crafts fit within existing ocean governance.”). 
18. See Van Hooydonk, supra note 15, at 405. 
19. See Erich D. Grome, Spectres of the Sea: The United States Navy’s Autonomous Ghost Fleet, 
its Capabilities and Impacts, and the Legal Ethical Issues that Surround, 49 JOURNAL OF MARITIME 
LAW AND COMMERCE 31, 50 (2018) (“[A] cyberattack could involve disrupting the commu-
nications between the vessels and their human monitors, leaving the ships unable to con-
tinue their previously assigned mission ….”). 
20. See Autonomous Shipping, IMO, http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTop-
ics/Pages/Autonomous-shipping.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2021). In light of the COVID-
19 pandemic, the work of IMO has been moved to a virtual format. Due to the inherent 
limitations of virtual technologies, substantive work on the MASS regulatory scoping exer-
cise has generally been deferred to later sessions; see, e.g., Provisional Agenda, IMO Doc. 
MSC 102/1/Rev.1 (Sept. 23, 2020) (noting that agenda item 5, Regulatory scoping exercise 
for the use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), has been postponed to the 
103rd session of the Maritime Safety Committee). As such, it is very unlikely that the IMO’s 
regulatory scoping exercise for the use of MASS will be completed in 2021, as originally 
planned. 
21. Id.; see also Aldo Chircop, Testing International Legal Regimes: The Advent of Automated 












The scope and ambition of the IMO’s undertaking are made manifest by 
the exponential growth of commercial, naval, and science-oriented un-
manned and autonomous vessels discussed above. In contrast to the IMO’s 
holistic review of MASS operations across the full panoply of maritime in-
struments under its purview, this article will chart a narrower course to ex-
amine the implications, opportunities, and challenges of autonomous vessels 
in three core Coast Guard mission areas of enduring significance to com-
mercial and naval operators alike: (1) search and rescue, (2) maritime coun-
terdrug operations and (3) navigational safety. 
 
II. SEARCH AND RESCUE 
 
The duty to render assistance to those in peril at sea—a “fundamental tenet 
of maritime law”22—is deeply embedded in the nautical tradition.23 That tra-
dition has evolved into legal duties codified in international conventions and 
domestic laws, which have formalized and strengthened the global search 
and rescue (SAR) system.24 The relevant international provisions are found 
in Article 98(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)25 and Chapter V, Regulation 33, of the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).26 Relatedly, the International Conven-
tion on Maritime Search and Rescue27 provides an international framework 
by which coastal States cooperate in the implementation of the global SAR 
system.28 These instruments are the lodestar for the Coast Guard’s statutory 
duty to “perform any and all acts necessary to rescue and aid persons and 
protect and save property . . . on and under the high seas and on and under 
                                                                                                                      
22. Paul W. Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace Unmanned Vessel Technol-
ogy, 40 TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL 197, 208 (2015). 
23. See, e.g., Rick Button, International Law and Search and Rescue, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES 101, 102 
(Jorg Schildknecht, Rebecca Dickey, Martin Fink & Lisa Ferris eds., 2018) (“The search for 
and rescue of persons in distress is a centuries-old, time-honored tradition.”). 
24. Id. at 111. 
25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
26. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. V, regulation 33, Nov. 1, 
1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter SOLAS]. 
27. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Apr. 27, 1979, 1405 
U.N.T.S. 97. 












water over which the United States has jurisdiction.”29 Collectively, the foun-
dational SAR duty expressed in these instruments is to render assistance “to 
any person found at sea in danger of being lost.”30 
The framing of this duty merits additional discussion. The duty to render 
assistance under UNCLOS Article 98 is addressed to the flag State, which in 
turn “shall require the master of a ship flying its flag” to render assistance to 
any person in peril at sea, to the extent such assistance can be rendered with-
out serious danger to the ship, crew, or passengers onboard.31 Flag States, 
many of whom are parties to UNCLOS or regard Article 98 as reflective of 
customary international law, must therefore determine how to require a 
“master” to render assistance where no mariner is physically aboard. 
While Article 98 is addressed to the flag State, in practice the rescue duty 
falls upon the master of the vessel.32 For it is the master that is charged to 
render assistance to those in danger and to “proceed with all possible speed 
to the rescue of persons in distress.”33 This is as it should be. Indeed, it is 
the master at sea that heretofore has been the “eyes and ears of the global 
SAR system.”34 This duty applies in like manner to commanding officers of 
warships of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard.35 This conclusion leads ineluc-
tably to the pivotal question of who, if anyone, is the “master” of a MASS? 
And if there is no “master” of a MASS, can the legal duty to render assis-




                                                                                                                      
29. 14 U.S.C. § 88; see also Sinclair, supra note 13, at 9. 
30. ALLEN, supra note 9, at 168. 
31. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 98 (emphasis added); see also ALLEN, supra note 9, at 
168; Button, supra note 23, at 112. 
32. See Klein, supra note 17, at 265 (“Under UNCLOS and the SOLAS Convention, 
this obligation rests with the master of the vessel.”); see also Pritchett, supra note 22, at 208 
(“As we can see from the various formulations of the duty to rescue, all place the obligation 
squarely on the master of the vessel.”); Allen, supra note 10, at 490 (“The master . . . has a 
duty to come to the aid of mariners in distress.”). 
33. UNCLOS, 25 note 25, art. 98(1)(b). 
34. Button, supra note 23, at 111. 
35. See THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE NAVAL OPERATIONS 3-
1–3-2, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A (2017), https://usnwc.lib-
guides.com/ld.php?content_id=38386466 [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 












A.  Defining the Master, Conceptualizing the Duty 
 
As autonomous vessel technology has progressed, a growing body of schol-
arship has sought to address the question of who, if anyone, is the master of 
a MASS?37 These inquiries have yielded no definitive answers. The difficulty 
can be attributed in part to the sheer dissonance resulting from the introduc-
tion of autonomous technology into a realm that has vested ultimate respon-
sibility for vessel and crew in a present ship’s master.38 Being present 
aboard—indeed, dutybound to remain aboard even under dire circum-
stances—has to date been the very essence of command at sea.39 Moreover, 
the mature framework of international conventions and domestic legal obli-
gations that reinforce the duty to render assistance were “designed for con-
ventional ships controlled by a master, officers and crew.”40 
The “master” of a vessel is defined internationally as “the person having 
command of a ship.”41 Whether a person can be said to have “command” 
of a ship requires an analysis of the degree of autonomy with which a given 
ship is operating. Accordingly, the IMO’s definition of MASS for purposes 
of its regulatory scoping exercise—“a ship which, to a varying degree, can op-
erate independent of human interaction”42—anticipates a spectrum of au-
tonomy. The first degree of autonomy, a “ship with automated processes 
                                                                                                                      
37. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 10, at 489 (“Is the shoreside operator of a remotely con-
trolled [unmanned maritime vehicle] that craft’s ‘master?’ Is the programmer (or program 
team) of a fully autonomous [unmanned maritime vehicle] the craft’s ‘master?’”); Pritchett, 
supra note 22, at 208 (“[W]ho is the master of a [unmanned surface vehicle]?”). 
38. See Henrik Ringbom, Regulating Autonomous Ships—Concepts, Challenges, and Precedents, 
50 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 154 (2019) (“Autonomous 
navigation . . . represents a much more fundamental challenge to the current regulatory 
environment. Autonomous navigation challenges the authority and role of crew members 
….”). 
39. See, e.g., Captain’s Uncourageous: Abandoning Ship Long Seen as a Crime, NPR (Apr. 18, 
2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/04/18/304541866/captains-uncourageous-abandon-
ing-ship-long-seen-as-a-crime (“In the U.S., case law indicates that a ship’s master must be 
the last person to leave [a sinking ship] and make all reasonable efforts to save everyone and 
everything on it.”). 
40. See Hooydonk, supra note 15, at 409 (“[T]he provisions of [UNCLOS] about the 
nationality of ships are designed for conventional ships controlled by a master, officers and 
a crew.”). 
41. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeep-
ing for Seafarers, ch. 1, reg. I(c), July 7, 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S 2. 
42. See Regulatory Scoping Exercise for the Use of Maritime Autonomous Surface 












and decision support,” presents an established and uncontroversial mode of 
operation in which seafarers aboard are assisted by electronic tools.43 These 
tools include, inter alia, autopilot, pre-programmed navigational track lines, 
or dynamic positioning systems that can be used for precision placement of 
aids to navigation, such as buoys.44 In this mode, the master is unquestiona-
bly still in “command” and subject to the duty to render assistance.  
The second degree of autonomy, a remotely controlled ship with seafar-
ers onboard, yields a similar conclusion. Namely, with seafarers still aboard, 
there is no difficulty in concluding that a physically present “master,” em-
powered to manually override remote operation, remains in command of the 
ship. Moreover, until autonomous vessel technology can better anticipate 
and respond to the virtually unlimited fact patterns presented to a master at 
sea, such an override capability will likely remain an operational necessity.45 
The duty to render assistance, whether articulated as a “hybrid” duty of the 
present master and the remote operator,46 or the non-delegable duty of the 
present master, persists unabated in the second degree of autonomy. 
The third degree of autonomy, a remotely controlled ship without sea-
farers on board, presents a more nuanced analysis. Can it fairly be argued 
that a remote operator at a computer screen or shoreside command center, 
                                                                                                                      
2018) [hereinafter IMO Doc. MSC99/WP.9] (emphasis added); see also Chircop, supra note 
6, at 19. 
43. See Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its One Hundredth Session an-
nex 2, IMO Doc. MSC100/20/Add.1 (Dec. 12, 2018). The IMO’s regulatory scoping ex-
ercise for MASS utilizes four “degrees of autonomy” for its analysis: (1) Ship with auto-
mated processes and decision support; (2) remotely controlled ship with seafarers on 
board; (3) remotely controlled ship without seafarers on board; and (4) fully autonomous 
ship.  
44. See Ringbom, supra note 38, at 150. 
45. See id. at 154 (“The prospect of a fully developed autonomy, in which a ship under-
takes an entire voyage totally without human supervision or involvement, is hardly realistic 
in the short term. For the forseeable future, at least, there will normally be some crew mem-
bers available to assume control of—and responsibility for—the ships operation, either on 
board or remotely.”); see also Scott N. MacKinnon, Yemao Man, Monica Lundh & Thomas 
Porathe, Command and Control of Unmanned Vessels: Keeping Shore Based Operators In-The-Loop 
(Paper presented at the NAV 2015 18th International Conference on Ships and Shipping 
Research), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281934219_Command_and_Con-
trol_of_Unmanned_Vessels_Keep_Shore_Based_Operators_In-The-Loop (“Humans 
must be retained within a system that is primarily controlled by intelligent computers in 
order to handle unexpected events not anticipated by the designers of the automated sys-
tem.”). 












“navigating” the crewless ship thousands of miles away, is that ship’s “mas-
ter?”47 Some commentators say it can. Professor Klein has suggested that 
where a crewless MASS is remotely controlled, the remote operator could 
serve as the “functional equivalent to the master,” to whom the duty to res-
cue would attach.48 Pritchett’s oft-cited analysis echoes this view: 
 
The remote operator of the USV is in control of the vessel just as much as 
a person physically present aboard it would be. This person determines the 
speed at which the USV operates, chooses where to steer it, and can decide 
whether or not the vessel will stop and assist others in need. As such, the 
remote operator is almost certain to be “in charge” of the USV . . . and 
therefore would owe a duty to rescue.49 
 
Pritchett’s analysis of what it means to be “in charge” or “in command” 
finds support in the Convention on the International Regulations for Pre-
venting Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), Rule 3 of which defines as “vessel 
not under command” as one “which through some exceptional circumstance 
is unable to maneuver as required by these Rules.”50 There is nothing inher-
ent in the remote operation of a crewless MASS that would suggest it is un-
able to maneuver as required by the COLREGS.51 A crewless but fully ma-
neuverable remotely operated MASS might therefore be, ipso facto, under the 
“command” of its remotely operating “master.” But not all commentators 
are so convinced. For example, Professor Van Hooydonk has observed that 
“the task of a shore-based vessel controller is not entirely similar to that of a 
ship’s master,” and “one cannot escape the feeling that such an interpreta-
tion [of functional equivalence] is too extensive and slips into interpretation 
per analogiam, something that tends to be frowned upon in international 
law.”52 
                                                                                                                      
47. See Allen, supra note 10, at 489 (“Is the shoreside operator of a remotely-controlled 
autonomous [unmanned maritime vehicle] the craft’s ‘master?’”). 
48. Klein, supra note 17, at 265. 
49. Pritchett, supra note 22, at 209. 
50. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea r. 3(f), 
Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.N.T.S 3459 [hereinafter COLREGS]. 
51. Whether a MASS can otherwise comply with the various COLREGs rules is taken 
up in Part II.C infra. 












Whether a remote operator can be treated as the functional equivalent 
of a ship’s master is a profoundly difficult53 yet critically important question 
in refining the international law and regulations associated with autonomous 
vessel operations. Indeed, the September 2019 IMO Report of the Interses-
sional Working Group on MASS identified clarification of the definition of 
“master” and “remote operator” as fundamental issues to be resolved in 
multiple IMO instruments, including the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW)54 and the SOLAS Convention.55  While it will take time to resolve 
the precise contours of these thorny legal and policy questions, it is not too 
soon to conclude that the duty to render assistance does attach to a remote 
operator. As an initial matter, the humanitarian principles that undergird the 
duty to render assistance counsel a bias toward action in favor of lifesaving 
at sea,56 irrespective of whether it is orchestrated by a physical master or a 
remote operator. Moreover, the robust and overlapping mechanisms of the 
global SAR system—imposing obligations to render assistance on commer-
cial, recreational, and military vessel masters alike57—augur in favor of ap-
plying a corresponding duty upon a MASS remote operator.58 
                                                                                                                      
53. See Pritchett, supra note 22, at 208 (“Unfortunately, these are not easy questions to 
answer.”). 
54. See Report of the Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Autonomous Surface 
Ships, IMO Doc. MSC 102/5/1, ¶¶ 3.6–3.7 (Oct. 10, 2019) (“[I]n particular, the definition 
of master would need to clarified and a definition of remote operator might need to be 
established.”). 
55. See id. ¶ 3.25 (“The Group noted that the definition of master, crew and/or respon-
sible person could be considered as a common potential gap and theme.”). 
56. See Resolution, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea ¶ 3.1, IMO 
Doc. MSC 167(78) (May 20, 2004) (“All persons in distress at sea should be assisted without 
delay.”); see also id. ¶ 5.1 (“Shipmasters have certain duties that must be carried out in order 
to provide for safety of life at sea, preserve the integrity of global SAR services of which 
they are a part, and to comply with humanitarian and legal obligations.”). 
57. See COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, at 3-1 (“Customary international law 
has long recognized the affirmative obligation of mariners to render assistance to persons 
in distress.”); see also Button, supra note 23, at 115–116 (“It also can be argued that, with this 
historical and universal principle enshrined in the SOLAS Convention, the Salvage Conven-
tion, and UNCLOS, the CO’s duty to render assistance to persons in distress constitutes 
customary international law.”). 
58. See Berg v. Chevron, 759 F.2d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The maritime rescue 












The fourth and final degree of autonomy is fully autonomous. This de-
scribes a ship whose operating system “is able to make decisions and deter-
mine actions by itself.”59 Such a ship seemingly obviates the role of a human 
“master,” as there is no such person in command.60 Thus, the fully autono-
mous vessel stands even further than the “remote operator” from traditional 
conceptions of a ship’s master. Still, Professor Allen, one of the principal law 
of the sea commentators to address autonomous vessel issues, has queried 
whether a “programmer (or program team) of a fully autonomous” vessel 
might be considered its “master.”61 Others have suggested that the autono-
mous vessel itself, as the entity “in charge” of its movement and operation, 
might be considered its own master, subject to rescue obligations.62 These are 
not hypothetical ponderings to nudge soft spots in existing norms. These are 
technological realities that may well redefine them. Indeed, advances in ma-
chine learning, a branch of artificial intelligence, have yielded computer pro-
grams that independently improve system performance over time through 
learned experience.63 As this iterative process of machine learning advances, 
the fully autonomous ship may become increasingly independent of its in-
cipient programming—more fully “in command.” The inquiry then becomes 
if, and when, a fully autonomous ship has so improved its understanding of 
a duty to render assistance and capacity to discharge that duty, that it be-
comes obligated to do so. While fully autonomous technology has not yet 
matured to the degree necessary to establish such a duty, the extant obliga-






                                                                                                                      
59. IMO Doc. MSC99/WP.9, supra note 42, annex 1. 
60. See Pritchett, supra note 22, at 209 (“[W]hen a USV operates autonomously, i.e., a 
computer has command of the vessel, there does not appear to be any person who can 
directly hold the status of master by definition.”); see also Dean & Clack, supra note 5, at 74 
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B. Benefits and Challenges: SAR and Autonomous Ships 
 
The above analysis concludes that a duty to render assistance at sea attaches 
to a ship with automated processes and decision support (degree one auton-
omy), a remotely controlled ship with crew members on board (degree two 
autonomy), and a remotely controlled ship without a crew (degree three au-
tonomy). It further suggests that fully autonomous ships (degree four auton-
omy) may eventually progress to such a degree that an affirmative duty ripens 
for such ships to render assistance. Given the onboard presence of a physical 
crew in degrees one and two, the SAR benefits and limitations of these au-
tonomous modes closely track those of existing SAR capabilities. This sec-
tion will thus focus on the unique SAR advantages and challenges presented 
by ships operating in degree three and four autonomy. 
 
1. SAR Benefits of Autonomous Ships 
 
The circumstances that occasion the need for rescue at sea often present 
unique dangers to those conducting SAR operations. In light of these inher-
ent dangers, “the duty to provide assistance [at sea] is a qualified one.”65 
Namely, a shipmaster need not place his or her ship, crew, or passengers in 
undue danger in order to effect the rescue.66 The incorporation of degree 
three and four MASS as a SAR force multiplier has the potential to greatly 
reduce the dangers that would otherwise face humans battling violent seas, 
punishing weather, and limited visibility while conducting maritime SAR op-
erations.67 Indeed, MASS may provide a two-prong benefit of safeguarding 
maritime first responders and increasing the resilience of SAR operations 
that would otherwise be limited or completely suspended by adverse condi-
tions.68  
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Autonomous ships may also enhance maritime domain awareness and 
detection capability as compared to manned rescue teams, particularly in sit-
uations of reduced visibility, through advanced suites of sensor technology, 
including infrared radar and thermal scanners.69 These cutting-edge ship-
board sensors, which are being developed in parallel with the “advent of 
remotely controlled and MASS,” aim to “extend the functionality of existing 
systems” and “provide entirely new abilities that have not been possible in 
the past.”70 Further, sophisticated sensor and communications packages may 
open new horizons for autonomous SAR cooperation between MASS and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). UAVs have already proven highly effective 
for the Coast Guard71 and the U.S. Navy,72 and are becoming increasingly 
prevalent in their operations.73 A number of commentators have suggested 
that joint UAV-MASS operations will enhance the operating range and de-
tection capabilities of the MASS, making MASS a more resilient, robust SAR 
asset.74 Maturing research on the SAR applications of “swarm intelligence” 
technology, in which “swarms of UAVs build upon cooperative behavior-
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TIME EXECUTIVE (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/un-
manned-vehicles-could-aid-search-and-rescue. 
70. R. Glenn Wright, Intelligent Autonomous Ship Navigation Using Multi-Sensor Modalities, 
13 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON MARINE NAVIGATION AND SAFETY OF SEA TRANSPOR-
TATION 503, 505 (2019). 
71. See Sinclair, supra note 13, at 22–23. 
72. See, e.g., Grome, supra note 19, at 46 (“Recently introducing the newest generation 
in UAV technology, DARPA announced the arrival of the Lightning Strike drone, equipped 
with new propulsion systems that increase the unmanned aircraft’s speed, maneuverability, 
and range . . ..”). 
73. See Kraska, supra note 9, at 61. 
74. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 70, at 505 (“Supplemental [MASS] capability at and above 
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based intelligence to efficiently locate one or multiple targets,” further but-
tresses the promise and potency of joint UAV-MASS operations.75 
 
2. SAR Challenges of Autonomous Ships 
 
While MASS technology has tremendous potential to enhance SAR capabil-
ities, MASS have a number of operational limitations that underscore the 
ways in which autonomous systems remain an imperfect substitute for 
crewed rescue platforms.76 The most glaring limitation of MASS is that they 
lack human rescuers to physically extract imperiled seafarers that may be im-
mobilized by injury or exposure. Even for the Coast Guard’s elite Aviation 
Survival Technicians (colloquially, “rescue swimmers”), who are specially 
trained “to save lives in the harshest conditions imaginable,”77 such rescues 
present extraordinary challenges. For a ship with no human crew, such res-
cues may be well-nigh impossible.78  
For a MASS to be operationally effective, it must be able to maintain the 
desired course or, if necessary, a fixed position.79 Researchers have found 
that factors including “large windage areas” of MASS, their relative weight, 
heavy currents, and rapid environmental changes can present substantial 
problems for a MASS in maintaining course or position.80 Of course, gale-
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Unmanned Maritime Systems, 98 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 567, 569 
(“[Unmanned maritime systems] may have design limitations that render them ineffective 
in certain circumstances to which the crews of manned systems might be better able to 
react.”). 
77. See Tristram Korten, The Waterlogged Hell of Becoming a Coast Guard Rescue Swimmer, 
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force winds, strong currents, and rapid environmental changes are often the 
predicate for initiating maritime SAR. Given these operational limitations, it 
is reasonable to conclude that a MASS may be unable to reach imperiled 
seafarers or remain on station to provide SAR assistance in extreme weather 
or sea states. These limitations tend to weaken the argument that unmanned 
maritime systems are a more “persistent” asset than their manned counter-
parts.81 Moreover, even when a MASS can reach a distressed mariner, it will 
likely have a limited capacity to provide emergency shelter or medical sup-
port.82 This is particularly true for large-scale rescue operations, occasioned 
by events such as transoceanic flight crashes and maritime refugee move-
ments, in which large numbers of people must be rescued at once.83 
But these operational limitations do not imply that MASS cannot play a 
pivotal role in the future of maritime SAR.84 As described above, MASS 
equipped with advanced sensors may shorten the time it takes to locate dis-
tressed mariners over a vast search area, particularly when working in tandem 
with a UAV. Further, while a MASS may be unable to personally embark 
mariners, it may be equipped to deploy a life raft or other temporary floata-
tion device.85 Similarly, a MASS that can supply even modest quantities of 
drinking water, food, and emergency medical supplies, such as insulin and 
gauze, may provide a lifesaving “bridge” until manned rescue forces arrive. 
These benefits lend credence to the recent, pithy observation that “to a per-
son in the water, the unmanned maritime vehicle would . . . be a massive 
improvement over nothing.”86 They also suggest that remote controlled and 
fully autonomous MASS systems will play an enduring and increasingly im-
portant role in the conduct of maritime SAR operations. 
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III.  MARITIME COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS 
 
The maritime domain has provided an abundance of food, energy, and trade 
benefits to the world.87 But it has also been a locus of activity for transna-
tional criminal and terrorist organizations that seek to exploit mare liberum for 
ill-gotten gains.88 Maritime drug trafficking, orchestrated by a web of sophis-
ticated and well-financed criminal networks,89 has been one of the most per-
sistent and vexing examples of such illicit activity.90 Indeed, “international 
trade in illegal drugs ranks third in value among global commodity flows,” 
trailing only oil and agriculture.91 The world’s oceans—particularly the West-
ern Hemisphere Transit Zone—have become the international highway for 
delivering many of these illegal drugs to market.92 Brian Wilson, Deputy Di-
rector of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Global Maritime Op-
erational Threat Response Coordination Center, observed that “transna-
tional criminal organizations operating in South America recognize the value 
of the oceans as critical routes, given the anonymity a ship enjoys over large, 
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ungoverned stretches of space, the relative complexities in jurisdiction, and 
the limited capacity of most countries’ coastal law enforcement.”93 
Much like the robust international legal and regulatory regime regarding 
maritime search and rescue, a mature multilateral treaty and U.S. domestic 
framework has been erected to confront maritime drug traffickers.94 The 
cornerstone of the maritime counterdrug regime is found in Article 108 of 
UNCLOS,95 which requires that all States “cooperate in the suppression of 
illicit drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high 
seas.”96 This obligation to cooperate in combating drug trafficking extends 
to the exclusive economic zone by operation of Article 58(2) of UNCLOS.97  
The United Nations, particularly the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 
has played a key role in developing the international maritime counterdrug 
framework. In fact, U.N. member States have concluded three conventions 
aimed at countering traffic in illegal narcotics at sea since 1961. While these 
conventions are “mutually supportive and complementary,”98 the most re-
cent and influential has been the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention).99 Col-
lectively, these conventions provide the international machinery necessary to 
operationalize UNCLOS Article 108’s obligation to cooperate in the sup-
pression of illicit drugs at sea. The fulcrum of that implementation is found 
in Article 17 of the Vienna Convention,100 which provides a mechanism for 
a party when it has “reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel . . . flying 
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the flag or displaying the marks of registry of another Party is engaged in 
illicit traffic,” to notify the flag State, request confirmation of registry, and if 
confirmed request permission to board the suspect vessel.101  
Most States are now party to the Vienna Convention. Indeed, it has come 
to represent an inflection point in global efforts to suppress illicit maritime 
drug flows.102 However, States Parties have had to fill interstices and ineffi-
ciencies in its framework. For example, while the Article 17 process is a path-
way for communications between governments to facilitate interdiction of 
suspect vessels, it can often be painfully slow.103  
To remedy this problem, the United States has entered into thirty bilat-
eral or regional agreements with countries in South America, Central Amer-
ica, the Caribbean, and West Africa. These agreements provide simplified, 
expedited procedures to facilitate verification of vessels registry, obtain per-
mission to conduct boarding operations, and coordinate disposition of 
seized contraband.104 The Coast Guard has complemented this robust net-
work of international agreements with advanced enforcement capabilities, 
including the deployment of its elite Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squad-
ron, which employs airborne use of force to operationally disable and inter-
dict non-compliant drug trafficking vessels at sea.105 As the lead federal 
agency for U.S. drug interdiction on the high seas, the Coast Guard has 
achieved unprecedented operational milestones. To that end, in both Fiscal 
Year 2017 and Fiscal Year 2018 the Coast Guard seized over two hundred 
metric tons of cocaine at sea.106  
The Coast Guard’s maritime counterdrug framework, while robust, is a 
necessary—but not sufficient—tool to combat the maritime trafficking of 
illegal narcotics. Indeed, the Coast Guard’s interdiction of 209.6 metric tons 
of cocaine at sea in 2018—a banner year by any measure—represented just 
7 percent of the nearly three thousand metric tons of known cocaine flow 
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through the Western Hemisphere Transit Zone during that period.107 This 
enforcement gap is attributable in part to the persistence of sophisticated, 
well-financed drug cartels that have proven adept at evading U.S. maritime 
law enforcement tactics.108 Specifically, drug cartels have engaged in a dec-
ades-long process of “evolution and adaptation” to escape detection and in-
terdiction at sea.109 This process began in earnest with the acquisition of fish-
ing or recreational vessels as drug carriage platforms, later refined by com-
plex drug concealment tactics.110 Traffickers then adopted lightweight, heav-
ily powered speedboats (“go-fast” vessels) to reduce at-sea transit time.111 
With the advent of helicopter interdiction that proved effective at stopping 
such go-fast vessels,112 drug traffickers again adapted their techniques 
through the introduction of “self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS)” or 
drug trafficking submarines, some of which are capable of storing up to fif-
teen tons of cocaine.113 The SPSS, which combines substantial drug payload 
capacity, long-range transit, and a low or non-existent surface profile, is the 
magnum opus of four decades of increasingly sophisticated drug trafficking 
techniques.114  
Even placing the nefarious diligence of drug cartels to one side, the vast 
expanse of the ocean remains the omnipresent, enduring challenge of mari-
time counterdrug operations.115 At some seven million square miles (approx-
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NUAL REPORT 8 (2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cne-annualreport-2010.pdf). 
109. See Casavant, supra note 92, at 199. 
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 200. 
112. See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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imately twice the size of the continental United States), the Western Hemi-
sphere Transit Zone poses a tremendous challenge for law enforcement of-
ficials seeking to locate and interdict drug traffickers.116 As noted by Coast 
Guard Captain Craig Wieschhorster, commanding officer of the 418-ft cut-
ter Stratton, “[o]ur biggest frustration [in conducting maritime counterdrug 
operations] is the expanse of the operating area. It’s the tyranny of distance. 
It’s a big operating area out there, and we’re literally running from case to 
case….”117 Thus, maritime law enforcement officers face not only an adap-
tive, persistent foil in enterprising drug cartels but must also meet them on 
an exceedingly vast field of battle. 
 
A. Counterdrug Benefits of Autonomous Vessels: Maritime Domain Awareness 
 
Given the above challenges, this section explores the ways in which the ben-
efits of autonomous vessel technology can substantially close the coun-
terdrug enforcement gaps faced by maritime law enforcement officials. At 
the same time, it acknowledges lessons of history that suggest transnational 
criminal organizations will seize upon that same technology as an integral 
component of their drug trafficking arsenal. In this regard, autonomous ves-
sel technology presents challenges that may indeed exacerbate illicit narcotics 
trafficking. Further, even where remote-controlled118 or fully autonomous119 
drug trafficking vessels are successfully interdicted at sea, there are practical 
and jurisdictional challenges in prosecuting a remote, anonymous vessel op-
erator.  
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The maritime counterdrug mission is predicated upon the establishment 
and enhancement of maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA is achieved 
through an “effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
maritime domain that could impact . . . security, safety, or [the] environ-
ment.”120 Given that over 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by 
water,121 the potential scope of anything associated with the global maritime 
domain is staggering. As suggested by Captain Wieschhorster and echoed by 
law of the sea scholars,122 the greatest barrier to fostering effective MDA is 
the ocean’s “tyranny of distance,” which strains finite enforcement assets 
and cloaks illicit activity.123 As such, leveraging autonomous vessel technol-
ogy is exceptionally important for the maintenance and enhancement of 
MDA over the global maritime commons. 
 
1. Greater Presence and Endurance 
 
A clearly marked autonomous warship providing law enforcement presence 
at sea is an inherent deterrent to illicit activity. Indeed, while maritime law 
enforcement analysis tends to focus on enforcement capacity, the ability to dis-
courage and deter illicit activity in the first instance is exceedingly valuable. 
As the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security has recently observed, maritime law enforcement 
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force structure and utilization is, in part, based upon providing a certain 
amount of enforcement presence in a given area that is predicted to have a 
level of activity of interest to the federal government (ex: Bering Sea & 
fisheries, Straits of Florida & illegal immigration, southern Caribbean, East-
ern Pacific & narcotics trafficking, Port state control inspectors w/in US 
ports, etc.) Part of the value of providing presence in each of these areas is 
quantified by violations detected and enforcement actions taken. However, 
leaders believe that the greatest value of providing presence is in the illicit activity that is 
deterred.124 
 
While traditional warships can maintain such presence, the duration of 
that presence can be truncated or entirely terminated by any number of cir-
cumstances. For example, warships engaged in counterdrug operations 
might be diverted for urgent search and rescue missions or to conduct bun-
kering operations following a long-range interdiction. Autonomous vessels 
can fill that operational gap, ensuring a continuous enforcement presence. 
Similarly, as compared to traditional crewed warships, autonomous vessels 
have greater operational endurance as they do not need to return to port to 
obtain food supplies or crew rest. These attributes of autonomous vessels 
yield a more persistent at-sea presence.125  
 
2. Enhanced Detection and Monitoring Capabilities 
 
As described in the search and rescue context, autonomous vessels offer a 
host of enhanced detection and monitoring capabilities.126 Indeed, a fleet of 
autonomous vessels equipped with sensor suites including radar, high defi-
nition video equipment, and forward-looking infrared thermal cameras 
would be particularly valuable in locating and tracking low- and no-profile 
drug trafficking platforms such as the SPSS.127 By optimizing this sensor 
technology, “unmanned naval vessels could serve in a wide variety of . . . 
missions including surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance, both on the 
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high seas and in littoral operations.”128 As Professor Guilfoyle has written, 
such robust intelligence acquisition is the tie that binds effective defense and 
law enforcement operations in the maritime domain.129 Moreover, while 
larger and more prominent warships provide a valuable deterrent effect, the 
possibility of deploying a number130 of “smaller, and hence stealthier”131au-
tonomous warships would make it more difficult for drug traffickers to avoid 
law enforcement vessels or to realize that they were being tracked by en-
forcement assets. In this regard, autonomous vessels promise to leverage one 
of the hallmark advantages of drug traffickers—i.e., stealth—as a powerful 
interdiction tool.  
 
3. Reduced Cost 
 
The daunting combination of a vast operating area, finite enforcement as-
sets, and enterprising drug trafficking organizations demands a law enforce-
ment response that is not only effective but efficient.132 Over the past decade, 
the Coast Guard has worked to recapitalize an aging fleet of patrol ships and 
aircraft133 due to a “flatlining” of budget appropriations and a consequent 
reduction in purchasing power.134At the same time, there have been persis-
tent calls for the U.S. Department of Defense to reallocate spending away 
                                                                                                                      
128. Yoo, supra note 81, at 454. 
129. See GUILFOYLE, supra note 90, at 301 (“In intercepting threats in the maritime 
domain, intelligence will always be crucial whether the mission is one of national defense or 
of law enforcement.”). 
130. See Yoo supra note 81, at 454 (“Unmanned naval vessels would . . . allow [ ] naval 
forces to deploy them in higher numbers . . ..”). 
131. Id. 
132. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Maritime Law Enforcement Operations and Intelligence in an Age 
of Maritime Security, 93 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 298, 300 (2017) (“Effective maritime 
law enforcement requires choices to be made about the deployment of finite assets. . . . 
Even the most well-resourced navies and coast guards cannot maintain a ‘cordon of steel’ 
around a national coastline.”). 
133. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42567, COAST GUARD CUTTER 
PROCUREMENT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, summary (updated Dec. 22, 
2020) (“The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR) calls for procuring 8 National Security 
Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 58 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) 
as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high endurance cutters, medium-endurance cut-
ters, and patrol craft.”). 
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from large, expensive naval vessels135 and toward more cost-effective, asym-
metric capabilities.136 Further, the increasingly devastating repercussions of 
the COVID-19 outbreak, and consequent emergency economic stimulus 
measures, are expected to exert additional downward pressure on U.S. de-
fense and homeland security budgets in the coming years.137 Collectively, 
these factors signal a future in which maritime enforcement assets will need 
to be more cost-effective while maintaining operational efficacy. 
                                                                                                                      
135. See Jessica T. Mathews, America’s Indefensible Defense Budget, NEW YORK REVIEW OF 
BOOKS (July, 18, 2019), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/07/18/americas-inde-
fensible-defense-budget (“[T]he navy remains wedded to new aircraft carriers, but at $13 
billion each they are arguably more an outdated symbol of twentieth-century power than an 
effective weapon system for a future in which they will be increasingly vulnerable to attack 
by high-speed, maneuverable missile that can be bought for a miniscule fraction of what a 
carrier costs.”) 
136. See Kurt M. Campbell & Jake Sullivan, Competition Without Catastrophe, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (Sept.-Oct. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-
with-china-without-catastrophe (“Washington should reorient its investments away from 
expensive and vulnerable platforms, such as aircraft carriers, and toward cheaper asymmet-
ric capabilities designed to discourage Chinese adventurism without spending vast sums.”). 
137. See Jim Thomas, A Blueprint for Rebuilding America’s Military After the Coronavirus, 
NATIONAL INTEREST (Mar. 28, 2020), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/blueprint-re-
building-americas-military-after-coronavirus-138282 (“Regardless of who is president, the 













In light of these budgetary constraints, autonomous naval vessels138 offer 
potentially vast cost savings.139 These cost savings would principally be real-
ized in the sharply reduced daily operating costs of autonomous patrol ves-
sels. Unlike traditional warships, autonomous vessels require no expendi-
tures for food, housing, or other amenities required by a human crew.140 
Similarly, autonomous vessels’ “efficiencies realized in ship design and use 
of fuel” stand to bolster the fiscal sustainability of enforcement operations.141 
This is particularly true in the counterdrug context, where the considerable 
daily operating costs of traditional warships142 are further heightened by sub-
stantial fuel expenditures needed to effectively patrol a vast operating area. 
As maritime law enforcement entities make tough choices about the use of 
finite resources to meet the demands of their varying mission sets, it will be 
                                                                                                                      
138. Some commentators have been careful to distinguish between naval operations 
and commercial shipping when evaluating cost savings associated with autonomous vessel 
technology. In the commercial context—particularly on large cargo ships or tankers—per-
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140. See Grome, supra note 19, at 45–46 (“The reduced cost is due to the smaller size 
of the [autonomous] vessel, principally due to the lack of sailors and their accompanying 
costs, such as food, housing, and other amenities.”); see also Sinclair, supra note 13, at 19 
(noting that drones are “inexpensive as compared to . . . their manned counterparts”). 
141. See Bernard Marr, The Autonomous Ships of the Future: Run by Artificial Intelligence Rather 
Than a Crew, FORBES (June 5, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/ 
2019/06/05/the-incredible-autonomous-ships-of-the-future-run-by-artificial-intelligence-
rather-than-a-crew/#79c0f1786fbf (“One study projected savings of more than $7 million 
over 25 years per autonomous vessel from fuel savings and crew supplies and salaries.”). 
142. See Grome, supra note 19, at 45 (“[T]he average cost to operate a U.S. destroyer in 












increasingly necessary to integrate autonomous vessel technology and capi-
talize on the promise of these cost savings. 
   
B. Counterdrug Challenges of Autonomous Vessels: A New Tool of Trafficking 
 
As discussed, the evolution of maritime drug trafficking has been marked by 
sophisticated methods of transporting and concealing illicit payloads.143 
From the repurposed trawler to the semi-submersible, the scope and speed 
of the traffickers’ innovations—fueled by a stream of drug proceeds—has 
been striking. This history suggests that the advent of autonomous vessel 
technology will, regrettably, inure to the benefit not only of law enforcement 
entities but to the criminal enterprises they seek to interdict. In the coun-
terdrug context, autonomous vessels are a classic double-edged sword. 
 
1. Autonomous and Remote-Controlled Drug Trafficking 
 
Transnational criminal organizations have successfully leveraged technology 
to generate income and facilitate their operations. For example, the notori-
ously ruthless144 Zetas drug cartel installed an array of antennas and repeaters 
throughout Mexico, allowing the cartel to communicate via an encrypted, 
secure network.145 The vast profits reaped by drug cartels146 provide them 
the ability to invest heavily in such technology. Cartels have also demon-
strated the ability to pursue a technological edge via other means, including 
the kidnapping of engineers.147 Simply stated, drug cartels now view ad-
                                                                                                                      
143. See supra notes 108–114 and accompanying text. 
144. See, e.g., 19 Bodies Hung From Bridge or Dismembered in Mexico Gang Fued, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/08/world/americas/mexico-
drug-feud-bodies-michoacan.html (“In 2012, the Zetas drug cartel dumped 49 decapitated 
bodies on a highway in northern Mexico, and that same year they strung nine bodies from 
an overpass and left 14 severed heads near the city hall.”). 
145. See Danielle Muoio, Here’s All the High-Tech Gear Cartels Use to Sneak Drugs into the 
US, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/cartels-use-tech-
to-sneak-drugs-into-the-us-2016-7. 
146. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Cocaine Incorporated, NEW YORK TIMES (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-
billions.html (“Mexican cartels reap $18 billion to $39 billion from drug sales in the United 
States each year.”). 













vanced technology as an operational imperative. As noted by Marc Good-
man, a leading commentator on global security and prominent author in the 
area of high-tech crime, “Criminals perpetually update their techniques to 
incorporate the very latest emerging technologies into their modi operandi . 
. . . Organized crime groups have established themselves as early adopters of 
technology. Criminals embraced the online world long before the police ever 
contemplated it, and they have outpaced authorities ever since.”148 
Indeed, Goodman cites the design and construction of the SPSS “narco 
sub” as a prime example of drug cartels’ early adoption of robotics technol-
ogy.149 Given the drug cartels’ penchant for leading-edge innovation, he ar-
gues that developments in SPSS technology will lead ineluctably to the car-
tel’s acquiring or inventing “autonomous underwater vehicles to transport 
narcotics.”150 While an autonomously operated SPSS has yet to be discov-
ered, Goodman is quick to note that this does not mean that such a vessel 
doesn’t exist. And, according to him, “if it doesn’t exist, it will soon.”151 
While fully autonomous drug trafficking vessels appear imminent, nas-
cent efforts to construct and operationalize remote-controlled drug traffick-
ing vessels have been underway for some time.152 In 2010, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Joseph Ruddy prosecuted Gustavo Garcia-Velasquez, Lope 
Lopez-Ortega, and Carlos Vera for a criminal conspiracy involving the con-
struction of such vessels.153 The defendants’ respective specializations—
electrician, fiberglass fabricator, and liaison with remote-controlled subma-
rine makers and buyers—facilitated the construction of remote-controlled 
                                                                                                                      
148. MARC GOODMAN, Prologue to FUTURE CRIMES: INSIDE THE DIGITAL UNDER-
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were, for many years, carrying . . . tons of kilos of cocaine and landing on the shores of 
Mexico.”) (quoting Goodman). 
150. See id. 
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nized Crime, 15 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 
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Rico. Divers then recovered the delivery and transferred it to Miami in cartel-owned speed-
boats.”) (citing MARK BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO 34 (2001)). 
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Assessment of Sea Based Criminal Organizations and Terrorist Operations, 8 HOMELAND SECURITY 












vessels capable of “carry[ing] up to 1,800 kilograms of cocaine” and travers-
ing one thousand nautical miles between refueling operations.154 Though de-
veloping and implementing SPSS technology does not come cheap—one 
drug “super-sub” seized in 2011 was estimated to have cost at least $5 mil-
lion155—the business case for cartels to develop autonomous drug delivery 
is compelling. The street value of a fully-laden SPSS can easily fetch drug 
profits into the hundreds of millions of dollars,156 rendering nugatory any 
financial losses should a remote-controlled submersible veer off course or 
be seized.157 In light of that business case and the premium that drug cartels 
place on technological innovation, it is hard to imagine a future of maritime 
drug trafficking that does not increasingly incorporate remote-controlled and 
fully autonomous drug delivery. 
 
2. Chasing Ghosts: The Challenge of Prosecuting Remote Traffickers 
 
Beyond the lure of profits, drug cartels have an independent, powerful in-
centive to incorporate remote-controlled and fully autonomous drug traf-
ficking technology: evading prosecution. Lawmakers in the United States 
have erected a formidable lattice of overlapping criminal statutes that have 
proven effective at reaching and criminalizing drug trafficking that occurs 
far from U.S. shores. The flagship U.S. maritime counterdrug statute, the 
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA),158 extended the reach of 
its predecessor, the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA),159 to confer 
U.S. criminal jurisdiction over a wide range of vessels including, inter alia, 
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U.S. flagged vessels, vessels owned by a U.S. person or business entity, for-
eign vessels on the high seas, and stateless vessels.160 The MDLEA prohibits 
an individual onboard a “covered vessel” from knowingly or intentionally 
manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis-
tribute, a controlled substance, and “applies even though the act is commit-
ted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”161 The MDLEA 
further expands the jurisdictional reach of the MHSA by, among other 
things, broadening the definition of stateless vessels and providing for appli-
cation to “foreign ships with foreign crews as long as the flag State con-
sents.”162 The advent of SPSS drug trafficking vessels—frequently sunk “at 
the first sign of law enforcement”163—laid bare unforeseen gaps in the oth-
erwise robust MDLEA framework.164 Specifically, SPSS “drug smugglers 
could skirt prosecution if law enforcement officials failed to recover evi-
dence of illegal activity.”165 Given the ease with which SPSS could be scuttled 
and sunk, as was often the case,166 Congress responded by enacting the Drug 
Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA),167which makes it a felony to 
operate, or merely embark upon, a stateless submersible or semi-submersible 
vessel seaward of any State’s territorial sea with the intent to evade detec-
tion.168 The DTVIA thus criminalizes conduct that facilitates drug traffick-
ing,169 irrespective of whether individuals were actually trafficking drugs 
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when found aboard an SPSS.170 Moreover, federal appellate courts have up-
held the DTVIA171 under the universal172 and protective173 principle of inter-
national law. 
The DTVIA highlights the underlying “‘cat-and-mouse’ dynamic be-
tween narco-traffickers and interdiction forces.”174 Indeed, the most recent 
iteration of that dynamic—elite aerial and surface law enforcement opera-
tions pitted against sophisticated drug trafficking vessels and submersibles—
was the prime mover of this legislative innovation. But the specter of re-
mote-controlled and fully autonomous drug trafficking vessels presents a 
new and formidable challenge for those on the enforcement side of the 
ledger—the cats if you will. The nub of this problem involves the related, 
but distinct, issues of identification and jurisdiction. 
Identifying the operator of a remote-controlled drug trafficking vessel is 
exceedingly difficult. As an initial matter, attribution to a specific remote op-
erator or cybercriminal is a notoriously fraught undertaking for even the 
most technologically advanced governments.175 A remote operator enjoys a 
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175. See David J. Lynch, How Experts Track Global Cyber Criminals, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(June 1, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e61146e0-2808-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89 
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WIRED (Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/12/hacker-lexicon-attribution-
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cloak of anonymity, may be located thousands of miles from the site of the 
vessel interdiction, and can leverage encryption technology to thwart digital 
intrusion by law enforcement.176 In a very real sense, the remote operator 
can “scuttle” the vessel—or more precisely, his digital connection to it—in 
a matter of seconds.177 Indeed, as former assistant attorney general for na-
tional security John P. Carlin observed, attributing activity on the internet 
and electronic media is uniquely challenging because malicious electronic ac-
tivity can be routed through “third-party proxies.”178 Moreover, even suc-
cessful attribution to an originating computer is insufficient where, as if often 
the case, “the person or group that controlled it” cannot be identified.179 
The challenges of identifying a remote electronic or cyber operator are 
being examined in a growing body of academic literature180 and government 
analysis181 on the law of cyber attribution. While these materials focus their 
analysis on various forms of computer network exploitation, the thrust of 
the legal inquiry for electronically facilitated drug trafficking is much the 
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same. Namely, the assignment of responsibility for malicious activity effec-
tuated through an electronic medium.  
Professor Eichensehr, a leading national security and cybercrime scholar, 
has noted that accurate attribution in cyberspace is a “crucial predicate” to 
criminal indictment.182 Thus, the application of both the MDLEA and 
DTVIA, which criminalize the conduct of “an individual,” are frustrated by 
the difficult task of identifying a specific remote operator. Similar challenges 
are faced in the case of fully autonomous drug trafficking vessels. As noted 
by Professor Allen, thorny questions regarding whether an autonomous ves-
sel’s programmer or program team are properly viewed as the vessel’s master 
have yet to be resolved.183 Moreover, even assuming arguendo an affirmative 
answer to this question, the chances of identifying such programmers may 
prove vanishingly small. In this regard, counterdrug law enforcement offic-
ers may feel as if they are chasing ghosts. 
Finally, in the event a remote operator or autonomous vessel program-
mer (or program team) can be located, the question remains whether a U.S. 
federal court can properly exert jurisdiction over that person, wherever 
found, under the MDLEA or DTVIA. For purposes of this analysis, it can 
reasonably be assumed that a remote-controlled or autonomous vessel used 
to transport drugs would lack an obvious connection to its place of origin or 
operator.184 Thus, a remote-controlled or autonomous drug trafficking vessel 
is unlikely to be registered or flying a flag and (by definition) has no master 
aboard to make a claim of nationality for the vessel. Under both the 
MDLEA185 and DTVIA186 such a vessel would be without nationality—a 
stateless vessel. This determination does not, however, end the jurisdictional 
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inquiry under each statute. Rather, autonomous vessels present novel ques-




The MDLEA explicitly provides for extraterritorial application,188 and appel-
late courts have generally found this “straightforward expression of extrater-
ritorial application” determinative.189 While the extraterritorial application of 
the MDLEA is well-established,190 it is less clear that Congress contemplated 
reaching the conduct of an extraterritorial remote operator or programmer 
of a drug-trafficking vessel. Specifically, the MDLEA’s proscribed conduct 
refers to an “individual” being “on board” a vessel, suggesting that remote 
or autonomous operation may fall outside the proscriptive sweep of the stat-
ute. 
Appellate court interpretations of the MDLEA’s statutory term “on 
board” suggest that while a remote operator or autonomous vessel program-
mer may be beyond the reach of the MDLEA’s substantive offense under § 
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7503(a), they would still be subject to the MDLEA’s conspiracy offense un-
der § 7506(b), which provides that “a person attempting or conspiring” to 
violate the MDLEA’s substantive offense is “subject to the same penalties.” 
In United States v. Ballestas,191 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
upheld the conviction of Ernesto Ballestas, a Colombian national, under the 
MDLEA’s conspiracy provision. Though Ballestas had never been on board 
the interdicted drug trafficking vessels, while in Colombia he was involved 
in a “drug trafficking organization that regularly transported drugs on board 
vessels traveling over the high seas.”192 The D.C. Circuit roundly rejected 
Ballestas’s contention that the qualifying phrase “on board” suggests that 
“the MDLEA should apply extraterritorially only when a person’s charged 
conduct took place on board.”193 In so doing, the D.C. Circuit found that 
conspiracy is established under the MDLEA where “criminal conduct took 
place ‘on board’ vessels covered by the MDLEA” and where “that criminal 
conduct is attributable to Ballestas as a co-conspirator.”194 Applying the rea-
soning of Ballestas suggests that a remote operator or programmer of a drug 
trafficking vessel would be a co-conspirator under the MDLEA, whose 
“overt act” in programming or remotely operating a drug trafficking vessel 
was “done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” However, the Ballestas court’s 
dicta suggesting that the presence of other co-conspirators on board the inter-
dicted vessel, attributable to Ballestas, would satisfy “any ‘on board a vessel’ 
requirement that might arguably circumscribe the MDLEA’s extraterritorial 
application,” merits consideration.195 While the question was not squarely 
before the court, this dicta could be read as indicating that someone must be 
aboard the interdicted vessel to sustain the MDLEA conspiracy conviction 




Should the question of prosecuting a remote operator or autonomous vessel 
programmer for maritime drug trafficking arise, the extraterritorial applica-
tion and jurisdictional reach of the DTVIA is likely to be upheld. As with 
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the MDLEA, Congress specifically provided for the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the DTVIA.196 Federal courts, observing that the DTVIA expressly 
applies to submersible and semi-submersible vessels without nationality, 
have had no trouble in upholding its extraterritorial application, finding that 
it does not offend constitutional due process requirements.197 Nor is the 
DTVIA textually limited, like the MDLEA, to the conduct of individuals 
“on board” a vessel covered by the statute. Rather, the DTVIA criminalizes 
the conduct of one who “who knowingly operates, or attempts or conspires to 
operate, by any means, or embarks in any submersible vessel or semi-submers-
ible that is without nationality.”198 
The “plain meaning rule” provides that courts should follow the plain 
meaning of the statutory text unless the plain meaning produces an absurd 
result.199 As the U.S. Supreme Court has become increasingly focused on text 
as the lodestar of statutory interpretation, so too has the prominence of the 
plain meaning rule.200 As then-Judge Kavanaugh noted in 2016, “[i]f the text 
is sufficiently clear, the text usually controls.”201  
The text of the DTVIA is sufficiently clear. First, it clearly criminalizes 
the mere “operat[ion]” of a submersible or semi-submersible vessel without 
nationality. Moreover, “operat[ion]” may be accomplished “by any means,” 
suggesting that Congress intended to criminalize a wide array of possible 
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197. See, e.g., United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F. 3d 1370, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted) (“We conclude . . . that international law permits any nation to subject 
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modes of operation.202 Given the broad scope of the statutory terms “by any 
means,” both extraterritorial operation of a remote-controlled SPSS or sub-
mersible vessel and extraterritorial programming of an autonomous SPSS or 
submersible vessel would likely constitute “operat[ion]” within the meaning 
of the DTVIA. Moreover, the statute uses the conjunction “or” to distin-
guish an alternate, independent mode of offense—embarkation. Thus, the 
DTVIA makes clear that operation alone,203 irrespective of embarkation, is 
sufficient to complete the offense. 
In conclusion, the advent of autonomous vessel technology bears both 
promise and peril in the context of maritime drug trafficking. For law en-
forcement officials, cost-effective autonomous vessels can be leveraged to 
mitigate the “tyranny of distance” that has proven the Achilles heel of tradi-
tional warships seeking to stem maritime drug flows. Moreover, cutting-edge 
sensor and infrared technology packages aboard autonomous and remote-
controlled enforcement assets can aid law enforcement in detecting low-pro-
file and submersible drug trafficking vessels.  
Regrettably, drug cartels have proven willing to invest heavily in technol-
ogy to advance illicit aims, and cartels will likely employ autonomous vessel 
capabilities with devastating efficiency. Even where autonomous or remote-
controlled drug trafficking vessels are found and interdicted, law enforce-
ment officers will face the enduring challenge of attributing illicit network 
action or electronic commands to a specific person.  
Finally, this section analyzed the jurisdictional reach of the MDLEA and 
DTVIA, concluding that while both are likely sufficient to reach the extra-
territorial conduct of a remote operator or programmer, federal courts will 
need to further consider if and to what extent to the MDLEA’s “on board a 
vessel” requirement truncates the MDLEA’s extraterritorial application in 
the context of autonomous or remote-controlled vessels.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
202. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 555 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“This 
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IV. NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY 
 
As with search and rescue and maritime counterdrug operations, autono-
mous vessel technology has profound implications for the future of naviga-
tional safety. A number of commentators have posited that autonomous ves-
sel technology will improve navigational safety writ large by eliminating hu-
man errors and incorporating a robust suite of sensor technology.204 But be-
fore these benefits can be realized, a number of threshold questions must be 
addressed to ensure that autonomous vessels can comply with the letter and 
spirit of the existing navigational safety regime. As the U.S. federal govern-
ment’s “navigation safety expert” and designated center of excellence for 
navigational safety, the Coast Guard will play a pivotal role in addressing 
urgent questions posed by the implementation of remote-controlled and au-
tonomous vessel technologies in the commercial and military context.205  
The corpus of international law, treaties, and regulations governing nav-
igational safety was drafted in contemplation of crewed vessels. Thus, im-
portant questions arise regarding if and to what extent existing instruments 
can adequately provide for the navigational safety of remote-controlled and 
autonomous vessels.206 The crux of the challenge for the “international mar-
itime legal system” was well-articulated by Professor Chircop: 
 
                                                                                                                      
204. See, e.g., Chircop, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that unmanned and autonomous ships 
“will likely be navigated more accurately and consequently with fewer errors, if any, than 
crewed vessels”); see also Robert Veal, Michael Tsimplis & Andrew Serdy, The Legal Status 
and Operation of Unmanned Maritime Vehicles, 50 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND COASTAL Law 
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259, 264 (2018) (“The pace of technological change is constantly increasing, and profession-
als wonder if regulatory processes can keep pace with technology, such as potential new 













Consisting of conventions and other legal instruments of the IMO, inter-
national maritime regulation addresses all ships and is largely premised on 
human presence on board in the control of the navigation of the ship, as 
well as performing contingent functions such as provision of notices, log 
book entries, reporting, and responding to distress calls for assistance. The 
provision of certain services to ships is also premised on human interac-
tion, such as in the case of pilotage where the master and [officer of the 
watch] cooperate with the pilot in formulating the passage plan and taking 
and executing navigation instructions. The human element is underscored 
by trained crews.207 
 
Because the extant legal and regulatory landscape is “premised on human 
presence on board,” it is anticipated that at least some changes will need to 
be made to bedrock navigational safety instruments, including the 
COLREGS and SOLAS Convention, in order to safely accommodate re-
mote-controlled and autonomous vessels operations.208 A comprehensive 
analysis of the full extent to which existing international instruments and 
related regulations may need to be adapted —a task currently underway via 
the IMO’s MASS regulatory scoping exercise209—is beyond the scope of this 
article.210 However, this section seeks to identify and analyze those areas of 
the regulatory and legal landscape that most urgently implicate navigational 
safety issues raised by MASS operations.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
207. See Chircop, supra note 21, at 20. 
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A. Collision Avoidance 
 
The COLREGS, which prescribe the maritime “Rules of the Road,” are the 
touchstone for the safe navigation and interaction of ships at sea.211 The sub-
stance and format of the COLREGS are largely mirrored by the U.S. Inland 
Navigation Rules,212 which were finalized in the years following the adoption 
of the COLREGS. Given the substantial similarities between the U.S. Inland 
Navigation Rules and the COLREGS, this analysis will refer only to the rules 
and text of the latter. 
A threshold question is whether the COLREGS apply to MASS opera-
tions. Under Rule 1(a), the COLREGS “apply to all vessels upon the high 
seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.”213 
The word “vessel” is further defined to include “every description of water-
craft, including non-displacement craft, WIG craft, and seaplanes, used or 
capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.”214 While much 
ink has been spilled on the question of whether a MASS constitutes a “ves-
sel,”215 this article urges that this question need not detain us long. Indeed, 
the weight of scholarly opinion, supported by broad interpretations of the 
                                                                                                                      
211. See Rules of the Road, USCG, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/NavRules/ (last visited 
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212.  Id. (“It is important to note that with the exception of Annex V to the Inland 
Rules, the International and Inland Rules and Annexes are very similar in both content and 
format.”). 
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479 (2016) (“[L]egislators have struggled to define the terms ‘ships’ and ‘vessel,’ and such 
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commercial craft, including autonomous vessels . . . has plagued maritime law.”); see also 
Chircop, supra note 21, at 9 (“The early discourse on MASS raised the question whether the 
autonomous vessels is in fact a ‘ship’ as generally understood in international maritime law 













word “vessel” or “ship” across the treaty landscape,216 tilts heavily in favor 
of finding that MASS are indeed “vessels” subject to the COLREGS.217 
There is also a prevailing majority, “perhaps a consensus,” among IMO 
member-States that at least some unmanned maritime vehicles are “ships.”218 
As noted by Professor Allen, this is as it should be: a COLREGS interpreta-
tion that is sufficiently broad to encompass MASS operations will better ad-
vance the COLREGS’ object and purpose of collision avoidance.219 
Having determined that MASS constitute a “vessel” subject to the 
COLREGS, certain COLREGS provisions present immediately apparent 
problems for MASS compliance. Most prominent among these is 
COLREGS Rule 5, which requires that “[e]very vessel shall at all times main-
tain a proper look-out by sight and hearing . . . .”220 The ability of a MASS 
to comply with this provision turns on what is meant by maintenance of a 
look-out “by sight and hearing.”221 Some authors have suggested that if a 
MASS had a sufficiently robust suite of auditory and visual sensors to con-
stitute the “functional equivalent” of a lookout by “sight and hearing,” it 
could be deemed in compliance with Rule 5.222  
                                                                                                                      
216. See Kraska, supra note 9, at 52 (“There is ample support in multilateral conventions 
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218. Allen, supra note 10, at 503. 
219. Id. 
220. COLREGS, supra note 50, r. 5. 
221. See Pritchett, supra note 22, at 204–5 (“Another example, and one which is perhaps 
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ment.”). 
222. See, e.g., Swain, supra note 12, at 141 (“[T]his paper asserts that a broad reading of 












This author is less sanguine. As an initial matter, unlike the SOLAS or 
STCW conventions, the COLREGS “do not include provisions for the sub-
stitution of equivalents for its requirements.”223 Further, commentators have 
correctly observed that “sight and hearing” are inherently “human qualities” 
and thus textually committed to being carried out by a human watch-
stander.224 Still, some have urged that various technological advances have 
already breathed some interpretive flexibility into the seemingly rigid require-
ments of Rule 5. For example, Professor Ringbom notes that SOLAS Regu-
lation V/19, which addresses totally enclosed bridges, provides for the use 
of a “sound reception system” such that the navigating officer on the bridge 
can hear sound signals.225 It can thus be argued that this SOLAS provision 
“effectively modifies the COLREGS Rule 5” and “accepts the prospect that 
human functions may be replaced by technology, at least as far as situational 
awareness is concerned.”226 
But a de facto “modification” to Rule 5 via a technological aid to the 
“hearing” of a mariner is on a different analytical plane than the technologi-
cal replacement of the mariner.227 Moreover, it is not at all clear that even the 
most mature sensor technology would provide a remote operator, or fully 
autonomous interface, a “full appraisal of the situation and the risk of colli-
sion,” as mandated by Rule 5.228 Given the critical safety functions provided 
by the lookout, unless such advanced technology is achieved, it is “unrealistic 
to expect that anything less than the equivalent of the sight of onboard sea-
farers will be accepted by regulators.”229 Thus, advocates of a “functional” 
approach to Rule 5 in the context of MASS operations must yield to the 
reality that sensors have yet to eclipse the human eye or ear in providing a 
“full appraisal” of the situation and risk of collision. A failure to acknowledge 
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these limitations will both imperil mariners and undermine the “text, con-
tent, and purpose” of the COLREGS.230 
The ability of MASS to comply with Rule 2 of the COLREGS, “Respon-
sibility,” has also been questioned.231 To facilitate the analysis of this provi-
sion, it is reproduced in its entirety: 
 
(a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, 
or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with 
these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by 
the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case. 
 
(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had 
to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, 
including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a depar-
ture from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.232 
 
Paragraph (a) of Rule 2 establishes a standard of conduct “required by 
the ordinary practice of seamen.” Properly discharging this duty requires, by 
necessary implication, human judgment.233 That conclusion is reinforced by 
paragraph (b), which contemplates interpretation of the rules according to a 
“due regard” standard, an inherently imprecise amalgam of the “entire col-
lection of duties and responsibilities [that] reflect internationally accepted 
norms” of conduct.234 Further, it makes clear that properly construing the 
rules may, in some cases, require a departure from them to avoid danger. There 
is a strong argument that a remote-controlled vessel, piloted according to the 
“ordinary practice of seamen” as dictated by a continuing cycle of human 
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judgment, could indeed comply with Rule 2(a).235 Similarly, a remote opera-
tor permanently in the navigational decision-making loop would likely be 
able to apply prevailing notions of “due regard” to avoid danger or colli-
sion.236  
For a fully autonomous vessel, however, these conclusions are much less 
certain. As an initial matter, even the most intrepid programmer would strug-
gle to translate the notion of “good seamanship”—a human-focused, judg-
ment-laden standard—into an autonomous navigation system.237 In essence, 
the question of whether a fully autonomous MASS can comply with 
COLREGS Rule 2 is bound up with the reality that this Rule, among others, 
is inextricably linked to the “influence of human decision-making and con-
duct.”238 While it is likely feasible to develop an algorithm that can capture 
and apply what is contained in the four corners of a given COLREGS rule,239 
Rule 2 contemplates more. Indeed, despite the necessary precision of the 
COLREGS, the proper application of a given rule “depends on a human’s 
ability to use common sense to not only determine if a situation currently 
                                                                                                                      
235. See Ringbom, supra note 38, at 155 (“The quoted rules, as with COLREGS gener-
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237. See Ringbom, supra note 38, at 155 (“It seems obvious that any effort to prepro-
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difficulties.”); see also Veal, Tsimplis & Serdy, supra note 207, at 38 (“[Rule 2] presents clear 
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when the overarching seamanship standard necessitates departure from the Rules is a highly 
sophisticated cognitive process beyond even the most impressive of modern control algo-
rithms presently employed by UMVs. Because of this, autonomous UMVs, it is suggested, 
cannot yet comply with Rule 2 if they are unsupervised.”). 
238. See Chircop, supra note 21, at 4 (“Across the field of maritime regulation, a source 
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applies, but also to exploit flexibility in the actions prescribed in a rule.”240 
Nor do the COLREGS allow for the wooden application of one rule in an 
analytical vacuum from other rules that might be implicated, or from the 
possibility that derogation from a given rule may be appropriate—indeed, 
necessary—under the circumstances. Thus, unless and until a fully autono-
mous MASS can consistently discharge the requirements of Rule 2 in a man-
ner “consistent not only with a human’s strict interpretation, but also a hu-
man’s common sense,”241 fully autonomous vessel operations will likely fail 
to comply with both the letter and the spirit of COLREGS Rule 2 as cur-
rently written. 
 
B.  Maritime Safety and Security  
 
Maritime safety encompasses a range of substantive requirements and pro-
cedural norms, ranging from specified emergency equipment to minimum 
standards for crew complement and training. While a number of conven-
tions under the auspices of the IMO touch on maritime safety issues, the 
SOLAS Convention is particularly relevant in the context of remote-con-
trolled and autonomous vessel operations. The SOLAS Convention is the 
IMO’s flagship instrument for issues of maritime safety.242 While it covers a 
range of maritime safety issues including, inter alia, lifesaving appliances 
(Chapter III), radiocommunications (Chapter IV), and carriage of cargoes 
and oil fuels (Chapter VI), this analysis will focus on SOLAS Chapter V’s 
provisions on the safety of navigation, and the challenges of application to 
autonomous or remote-controlled operations.  
Rule 14 of Chapter V, “Ship’s Manning,” provides an illustrative exam-
ple. That provision specifies that “Contracting Governments undertake” to 
maintain or adopt measures to ensure that its national ships are “sufficiently 
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and efficiently manned” from “the point of view of safety of life at sea.”243 
As an initial matter, the term “manning” is itself in tension with the notion 
of fully autonomous vessel operations and, to a lesser extent, remote-con-
trolled operations. Further, paragraph 2.1 of Regulation 14 dictates that the 
administration of each contracting government “shall establish appropriate 
minimum safe manning,” which suggests that some manning is a threshold 
requirement.244 Similarly, the Rule 14.3 mandate for establishing a common 
“working language” on all ships to “ensure effective crew performance in 
safety matters” underscores the implication of crew presence.245 Nor is Reg-
ulation 14 an isolated example of provisions that assume the presence of a 
live crew. Regulation 15, for example, speaks to “tasks to be performed by 
the bridge team and the pilot.”246 Other provisions are less obvious but 
equally compelling in suggesting human involvement. Regulation 21, for in-
stance, requires all ships to carry an updated copy of the International Aer-
onautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual.247 This Regulation would 
be rendered superfluous if SOLAS Chapter V was interpreted to permit an-
ything short of human presence.248 
Still, the SOLAS Convention presents a more flexible regime than the 
COLREGS and thus may be more readily adaptive to MASS operations. For 
example, the SOLAS Convention explicitly provides for the possibility of 
“Exemptions”249 and “Equivalents”250 under certain conditions. Moreover, 
unless expressly provided otherwise, by its terms, SOLAS regulations do not 
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apply to large classes of vessels including, inter alia, warships, pleasure yachts, 
and fishing vessels.251 By contrast, the COLREGS apply to “all vessels,” and 
certain rules, including provisions regarding safe speed252 and lookouts,253 
apply “at all times.” Thus, while certain changes to SOLAS will likely be 
needed to fully address MASS operations, the enhanced flexibility provided 
by exemptions and equivalents will greatly facilitate the amendment process. 
Maritime safety is inextricably linked to maritime security. Indeed, as 
Professors Kraska and Pedrozo have observed, “there is difficulty in sepa-
rating maritime safety from maritime security, and the two sets of activities, 
which have developed independently, have become intertwined.”254 Auton-
omous and remote-controlled vessel operations, orchestrated through state-
of-the-art digital networks and advanced computer infrastructure, present a 
unique maritime security risk in the form of cyberattack.255 Following a dev-
astating 2017 cyberattack against the leading maritime shipping company 
Maersk,256 the global maritime industry is “now painfully aware that physical 
shipping operations are vulnerable to digital disruption.”257 Similarly, naval 
forces will have to contend with “a new breed of fighting in the form of 
cyberwarfare,” including the hacking of remote-controlled and autonomous 
vessels.258 At the same time, unmanned vessels in both the military and com-
mercial contexts will likely be more susceptible to transnational criminal ac-
tivity, including theft or piracy.259 While cyber intrusion, enemy attack, and 
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criminal interference are not the only maritime security threats posed by 





The era of autonomy on the world’s oceans has indeed arrived. As the above 
discussion has aimed to demonstrate, this reality carries with it the promise 
of a more capable global regime for maritime SAR operations, superior law 
enforcement tools to detect and interdict maritime drug traffickers, and en-
hanced navigational safety. At the same time, it has stressed that embedded 
within each of these opportunities are formidable challenges and risks. Spe-
cifically, the precise contours of the duty to render assistance at sea, tradi-
tionally discharged by the master of a vessel, have yet to be defined in the 
context of MASS operations. This is particularly true for fully autonomous 
vessels, to whom the duty to render assistance does not yet attach. In the 
context of drug trafficking, autonomous vessels will not inure to the benefit 
of law enforcement officers alone but will likely become the next iteration 
of criminal organizations’ pursuit of technology to advance their illicit aims. 
Finally, while autonomous vessel technologies may one day render ocean 
navigation a safer enterprise by reducing or removing human error, that day 
has not yet come.260 Moreover, much of the extant navigational safety regime 
enshrined in international instruments, including the COLREGS and SO-
LAS Convention, presuppose human crews and at times demand uniquely 
human judgments. In closing, this article suggests that these challenges and 
risks, while formidable, are not insurmountable. However, adequately resolv-
ing these issues will require—in technical, legal, and diplomatic fields—the 
same ingenuity and resolve that has brought us to the threshold of an auton-
omous future at sea. 
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